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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
LEIL.A. R. BROWN,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-\S.-

THO}LA.S E. BROWN,
Defendant and Appell{liYI;t.

Brief of Appellant
THE FACTS
This is an action for divorce, in which the original
decree was entered on Jlrn.e 27, 1947. In that decree
defendant was ordered to pay to the plaintiff $15.00 per
week for the support and maintenance of two minor
children. (R. 2.) On August 25, 1949, pursuant to a
stipulation of the parties, the court entered an order
decreeing that the defendant had on that day paid
plaintiff $500.00, which constituted payment in full for
all judgments of the court theretofore entered, and that
the defendant was not obligated to plaintiff in any
1
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amount except for the monthly payments thereafter to
accrue under said order. It was further ordered that
the decree entered June 27, 1947, as modified by the
order dated January 6, 1949, be further modified so as
to require the defendant to pay the sum of $40.00 per
month (rather than $60.00) in two installments of
$20.00 each payable on the first and fifteenth of the
month commencing September 1, 1949. (R. 16-18.) This
order, so modifying the decree, further provides as follows, in paragraph 4:
"It is further ordered that in the event the defendant shall default in the payment of the sum
of $40.00 per month as herein provided, and shall
remain in default for a period of thirty days, then
the provision of the decree heretofore entered
requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
the sum of $60.00 per month for the care and
support of the two minor children of the parties
shall be automatically reinstated." (R. 19.)
Pursuant to the order of the court, the defendant
paid $20.00 on September 1, 1949, $20.00 on September
15, 1949, $20.00 on October 30, 1949, and $20.00 on November 7, 1949. (R. 42.) The defendant was delinquent
at the time of the hearing in the amount of $20.00, representing the payment due November 1, 1949. (R. 41-42.)
Counsel for plaintiff pressed the issue of contempt
and in exoneration of such charge the defendant testified that he 'vas self-employed and was engaged in the
servicing of refrigerators and household appliances;
that he had no regular date upon which he received any
Income; that he didn't make the payments on October
2
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1st and 15th because he did not have sufficient money;
that during the month of October he made about $110.00;
that aside from the payment of $20.00 which he made to
the plaintiff on October 30th, he paid for groceries for
his family and boug·ht himself a pair of work shoes; that
he "Tas married: that he did not spend any part of his
income on drink or entertainment; (R. 45-46) that from
Xovember 1st to the date of the hearing he earned about
$100.00, out of 'Yhich he paid $20.00 to plaintiff on November 7th; that he also spent some of his income on
food, phone and lights; that he needs a telephone to
operate his business. He expected to have a check on
the following day that would enable him to make the
payment that was due November 1st; that he borrowed
the money to pay the $500.00 settlement in August and
h~ was under obligation to pay that money back at 5 per
cent interest, the payments being $15.00 per month, but
that he had not made any payments on that loan. (R. 4647.) During the previous month when he made the payments as ordered, defendant earned about $175.00. There
are five members in his present household, (his wife and
her three children) and his food expense runs about
$20.00 per week; that out of the money earned in September he paid $10.00 in repairs to his car, which is
essential to the earrying on of his business. During
September he also bought $15.00 worth of hand tools,
which he used in his business; that he didn't spend any
money in September on liquor; that during the month
of September he went to two or three shows, and spent
about $20.00 on some delinquent bills that were incurred
prior to the divorce. (R. 48-49.) The car he operates is
3
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a 1937 Packard, which belongs to his present wife. (R.
53.) The defendant testified that he had written a letter
inquiring about a job, and that he would accept such
work if he could obtain it, provided it was more profitable than his present work.
Upon these facts, which were uncontradicted, the
District Court found and adjudged the defendant to be
in contempt of court for the non payment of the $20.00
delinquency, and the court in its decree reinstated the
terms of the earlier decree and modified the order
entered on August 25, 1949, to the extent that the defendant was ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of $60.00
a month in two semi-monthly installments commencing
December 1, 1949. (R. 29-30.) The court further ordered
the defendant to pay $50.00 to the plaintiff for her attorney fee. The defendant requested a stay of execution
for a couple of weeks to enable him to·. pay the delinquency, but the motion was denied. (R. 57.) Thereupon
the committment was issued and the defendant was confined in the County Jail,· from which he was liberated
upon the filing of a notice of appeal and bond. ( R. 33-37.)
The defendant has prosecuted this appeal from that
decree.

4
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POINT.S UPON ''rHICH APPELLANT RELIES
FOR REVERSAI.J OF JUDGl\1ENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND AND
ADJUDICATED DEFENDANT TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT.
1.

2. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING THE
ORDER ENTERED AUGUST 25, 1949, AND IN REINSTATING
THE ORDER ENTERED JANUARY 6, 1949.
3. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY PLAINTIFF A $50.0D-COUNSEL FEE UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND AND
ADJUDICATED DEFENDANT TO BE IN
CONTEMPT OF COURT.

It is true that the defendant did not strictly comply
with the District Court order entered August 25, 1949,
in that he failed to make the payments in October and
November at the times on which such payments fell due
and he was delinquent in the sum of $20.00 at the time
of the hearing. It is well established, however, that a
mere failure to strictly comply with the order of the
court does not constitute a civil contempt unless such
non-compliance was deliberate, willful or contumacious .
•
Hillyard v. District Court of Cache County, 68 Utah 220,
249 P. (2d) 806, and the cases therein cited. Parish v.
Ll1cConkie, 84 Utah 396, 35 P. (2d) 1001.
5
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There is nothing in the record which supports the
court's finding that the defendant willfully failed to
comply with its order, nor is there evidence in the record
to support the court's finding that the defendant was
then capable of complying with the order. The defendant had demonstrated his good faith by borrowing
$500.00 from his father to pay on the delinquent account
incurred prior to the order of August 25, 1949, and he
had made the payments requested by that order on September 1st and 15th. Ilaving earned only about $110.00
in October, he was unable to make the payments as they
fell due during that month. With a wife and three
children sitting at his table, with utility bills to be paid,
with an irregular income amounting to $110.00, it is inconceivable to us that the court could find evidence in
the record to support its finding that the defendant willfully, contemptuously and deliberately disregarded its
order. Although in legal contemplation the first duty
of defendant was to support the two children by his
first marriage, the needs of the present members of his
household could not altogether be disregarded. There
is nothing contemptuous or willful in the diversion of
portions of defendant's income for the feeding of the
hungry mouths that surround his present table; and if
the needs of the first household and second household
were to be compared, certainly the $500.00 paid in
August and the $40.00 paid in September would insure
against any suffering on the part of the plaintiff and the
two children in her custody. The record discloses no
misuse of the defendant's income during the period in
controversy. The expenditure of $10.00 to keep the
6
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automobile running, of $15.00 for tools used in his work,
and the purrhase of a pair of shoes for the defendant,
can not be regarded as other than requisite. There was
no 'Yaste or squandering of income on drink, clothing,
traYel, luxuries, gambling or entertainment. Even the
$3.00 spent during the t"To-month period for entertainment vras spent during the month of September, when
the defendant had sufficient income to comply with the
court's order. In Yiew of the defendant's limited income, it is nothing short of miraculous that he could
arrive at the date of the hearing with just a $20.00 delinquency. \Ve do not know what more the defendant
could have done that he failed to do in the equitable
distribution of his limited wealth, nor can we perceive
in what manner his ability to comply with the court's
order with respect to the delinquency and with respect
to future payments could be enhanced by a ten-day sentence in the County Jail, accompanied by awards of
attorney's fees and court costs. The punishment the
District Court inflicted upon the defendant, if approved
by this court, will add and not detract from the sufferings of the children in the two households defendant is
required by law to maintain.

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING THE ORDER
ENTERED AUGUST 25, 1949, AND IN REINSTATING
THE ORDER ENTERED JANUARY 6, 1949.

No new circumstances were either pleaded or proved
in this matter and the sole authority for the court to
7
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modify its decree must find basis in the interpretation
of paragraph 4 of the decree as applied to the facts of
this case. As we read it, the decree provides that in the
event the defendant shall be in default to the extent of
$40.00 and shall remain in default to that extent for a
period of thirty days, then the provisions of the earlier
·order requiring the payment of $60.00 per month could
be automatically reinstated. There is no ambiguity in
the provision, and we do not believe it to be fairly susceptible to any other interpretation. Aside from that,
the defendant was never in default in any amount for a
period of thirty days. The payment due October 1st
was made October 30th, the payment due October 15th
was made November 7th. The only payment remaining
due at the time of the hearing was the one which accrued
on November 1st. The longest period of delinquency
was in October when the $20.00 delinquency existed for
twenty nine days and there was a $40.00 delinquency for
a· period of fifteen' days. At the time of the hearing the
defendant was delinquent in the amount of $20.00 for a
period of fourteen days.
It is a well-established principle of law that where
a debtor makes payments on a running account and
neither he nor his creditor makes a particular application of such payments, the law will apply them to the
.first items in the debt. Naidech v. Hempfling, (New Jersey) 24 Atl. (2d) 524; Birkhauser v. Ross, (California)
283 Pac. 866; Radichel v. Federal Surety Company,
(Minn.) 212 N.W. 171; State ex rel. Spillman v. Security
· State Bank of Eddyville, (N ebra.ska) 218 N.W. 407; March
8
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v. B~ttler, (South Dakota) 220 N.W. 461. In the case at
bar neither the plaintiff nor the defendant indicated
that portion of the support account to which the payments made on October 30th and November 7th were to
be applied. Under the authorities above cited, it is clear
that the October 30th payment should be applied by the
court to the amount due October 1st and the November
7th payment should be applied by the court to the
amount which fell due October 15th. The conclusion is,
therefore, inescapable that the defendant wa.s never in
default in any amount for a period of thirty days, an~
the court, therefore, erred in reinstating the terms of
the earlier decree in violation of the provisions of the
stipulation and decree entered on August 25, 1949.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ORDERING DEFENDANT
TO PAY PLAINTIFF A $50.00 COUNSEL FEE
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

This case has another unfortunate aspect, in that
the circumstances of the defendant are not such that he
is able to support and maintain two households and in
addition to that an attorney who deems a $20.00 default
of sufficient moment to warrant the institution of contempt proceedings-and this within two months after
his client has been paid $500.00 by the defendant, who
had to borrow from his father in order to make such sum
available to the plaintiff. Was her need and the need
of the children so desperate that the defendant must be
hailed into court without being given the courtesy of a
9
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letter warning him of the dire consequences that would
follow his monumental default~ Although it is conceded
that ordinarily the sum of $50.00 is of minimum reasonableness in connection with the prosecution of a hearing
on· an order to show cause to enforce compliance with
a support decree, yet whether or not the defendant
should be required to pay such fee is a matter within
the so.und discretion of the court. Obviously, with the
$500.00 which she had received August 25, 1949, and the
$80.00 that she had been paid thereafter, the plaintiff
was in a much better position than the defendant to
defray her own legal expense. We earnestly submit that
it was a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
District Court to allow a $50.00 attorney's fee for the
collection of a $20.00 delinquency under the circumstances of this case. Certainly the practice of instituting
a contempt proceeding for a $20.00 delinquency with
attendant claims for counsel fees and court costs should
not be encouraged. It would seem that our courts have
sufficient litigation before them without such improvident enlistment of their facilities.
CONCLUSION
We, therefore, respectfully conclude that the judgment of the district court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD W. CLYDE
WOODROW D~ WHITE
ALLAN E. MECHAM
.Attorneys for .Appellant.
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